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Pandemic and public health controls: Toward
an equitable compensation system
Theresa Ly, MJ Selgelid and I Kerridge*
There is increasing global concern about the potential impact of pandemic
infections, including influenza, SARS and bioterrorist attacks involving
infectious diseases. Many countries have prepared plans for responding to a
major pandemic. In Australia, the Federal and State pandemic plans include
measures such as contact tracing, ensuring availability of antimicrobials,
quarantine and social distancing. Many of these measures would involve
severe restrictions on individual citizens and small businesses. Issues of
compensation for cooperation and compliance with pandemic plans need to
be addressed in policy discussion. The instrumental benefits of compensation
in the event of a pandemic have not been sufficiently recognised. Greater
attention paid now to mechanisms to compensate individual and business
costs associated with compliance would increase trust in government
pandemic plans, encourage compliance and reduce the health and economic
impact of a pandemic.
There is increasing global concern about the impact of potential pandemics arising from influenza,
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), other emerging infectious diseases or bioterrorism. In
relation to H5N1 avian flu, the current concerns are the speed of global spread, the high mortality rate
for humans, and the potential that mutation will lead to widespread human-to-human transmission.
Human cases have been reported, with the latest (as of March 2007) being a fatal case in the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic.1 Human-to-human transmission was suspected in Vietnam as early as
June 2004 and was confirmed in Thailand in January 2005.2 In May 2006, the spread of avian
influenza in a family likely involved human-to-human transmission,3 and a recent case in Indonesia
raised similar suspicion.4
The potential ramifications of a pandemic are serious. An outbreak of H5N1 avian flu could result
in up to 142 million deaths and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) loss of $US4.4 trillion.5 In response,
many countries have instituted plans to counter the possible consequences of a pandemic. A vast
amount of time and resources has been dedicated to examining public health aspects of emergency
preparedness, pandemic planning committees and scientific research aimed at vaccine development.
The majority of the pandemic plans developed, including those produced by the Australian Federal
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and State governments,6 include mechanisms to prevent and control infection such as contact tracing,
prioritised distribution of antivirals, quarantine and other social distancing measures. In general,
however, post-pandemic plans have failed to sufficiently explore mechanisms that may reduce the
adverse socio-economic impacts of pandemics.
This article argues that governments should devise financial plans to compensate businesses and
individuals who suffer losses during pandemic and post-pandemic scenarios when the losses relate to
compliance with public health measures, with the principle of reciprocity as a basis. Implementation
of a compensation scheme would help reduce the negative economic impact of pandemics, increase
trust and confidence in government, provide incentives for compliance and cooperation with pandemic
plans, and thus reduce the negative health impact of pandemics.
MEDICAL ETHICS IN TIMES OF PANDEMICS
Ethical analyses of infectious diseases and pandemic infections have tended to concentrate on a
limited number of issues, including those relating to the allocation of limited medicines and human
rights concerns about quarantine and other infringements of individual liberty. Another issue that has
received a great deal of attention, however (perhaps because it is centred on the clinical dyad and on
professional ethics), has been health workers’ “duty to treat” patients who may pose a risk of infection
or death. This issue has assumed particular significance in relation to pandemics, where questions have
been raised about the likelihood of doctors providing adequate care and the best means by which care
provision can be guaranteed.7
Despite the contemporary emphasis on the “duty to treat”,8 historical analysis of pandemics
shows that issues relating to the duty to treat were not of major importance. During the devastating
1918 “Spanish” flu pandemic, eg, a doctor refusing to treat patients was the exception rather than the
rule.9 Driven by patriotism and a moral commitment to a “just” war (ie, World War I), most physicians
stayed and worked; and many died. However, it is not merely “special circumstances” such as these
that compel doctors to treat the sick even when it is dangerous to do so. The contagious nature of the
Black Death, which ravaged Europe from 1348 to 1350, was well understood, and ordinary social (and
moral) obligations were abrogated.10 Children deserted parents, wives deserted husbands and children
were abandoned. Many physicians ran; but many more remained, died and in doing so allowed moral
continuity and the preservation of an implicit social contract. As de Chauliac stated: “[A]nd I, to avoid
infamy dared not absent myself but with continual fear preserved myself as best I could.”11 In more
recent times the SARS outbreak illustrated that health professionals felt compelled to provide
treatment to patients despite experiencing fear and guilt arising from the possibility of exposing loved
ones to the infection.12
The view of the physician’s duty in the face of the fear of “coming to harm” is implicitly
grounded in the social contract. The social contract does not eliminate fear but rather it necessitates
dealing with fear so that appropriate actions result.13 As long as the contract is in force and not
abrogated publicly, it is likely to retain moral force.
6 New South Wales Government, Department of Health, Interim Influenza Pandemic Action Plan (2005); Australian
Government, Department of Health and Aging, Australian Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza (2005).
7 Savulescu J, “Conscientious Objection in Medicine” (2006) 332(7536) BMJ 294.
8 University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics Pandemic Influenza Working Group, Stand on Guard for Thee: Ethical
Considerations in Preparedness Planning for Pandemic Influenza (2005), http://www.utoronto.ca/jcb/home/documents/
pandemic.pdf viewed 6 January 2006.
9 Barry JM, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History (Viking, New York, 2004).
10 Loewy EH, “Duties, Fears and Physicians” (1986) 22(12) Social Science & Medicine 1363.
11 Campbell AM, The Black Death and Men of Learning (AMS Press, New York, 1966).
12 Maunder R, Hunter J, Vincent L, Bennett J et al, “The Immediate Psychological and Occupational Impact of the 2003 SARS
Outbreak in a Teaching Hospital” (2003) 168(10) Canadian Medical Association Journal 1245.
13 See Loewy, n 10.
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While the debate regarding professional obligations to treat patients with contagious diseases may
be important, it has taken attention away from other issues of moral and social importance and thus
restricted consideration of the range of public health measures that would ensure public and
professional compliance in a just and morally defensible manner.
THE WIDER IMPACT OF PANDEMICS
Major epidemics have the potential to destabilise economies. Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, eg,
lost US$80 billion and 0.5% of GDP due to the SARS epidemic of 2003, which resulted in 800
deaths.14 While that was a substantial impact, a major flu pandemic would be much more severe.
Compared to the Spanish flu, which killed 20 to 100 million people worldwide,15 the death of 800
people is relatively insignificant. An influenza pandemic could easily cost the Australian economy
over A$50 billion.16 Because an avian flu pandemic would not likely be as small-scale or short-lived
as SARS, it could be much more fatal to people and economies.17
The Australian Government has acknowledged the potential losses that may follow a pandemic by
considering macro-economic policies to alleviate harm to the community. The Treasury Working
Paper, eg, proposed to implement expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to reduce the impact on
the economy18 and counter the reductions in consumption of goods and services. While such policies
may have merit, other measures that may reduce the impact of pandemics have not been sufficiently
considered.
Given the potential consequences faced by businesses and the community, the Australian
Government should also ensure that those adversely affected by measures implemented receive
support. The report of the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics Pandemic Influenza
Working Group rightly states that reciprocity should be a key value in pandemic influenza
policy-making.19 Reciprocity requires society to support those who face a disproportionate burden in
protecting the public good and take steps to minimise burdens as much as possible. Measures to
protect the public good are likely to impose a disproportionate burden on those whose behavior is
restricted. It is fair for those affected to receive recognition for complying with measures that seek to
protect society. For example, reciprocity requires that health personnel compelled to work receive
perhaps an insurance fund for life or other means of support in recognition of services rendered in
times of pandemic, or priority in the allocation of limited avian flu vaccines and antiviral drugs.
Although not considered in this article, recognition of health personnel putting themselves in the
front-line of a pandemic can be made by the National Influenza Pandemic Action Committee giving
priority to this group. Such provisions would be fair: if health personnel are expected to place
themselves in danger to protect society, in return they should be offered protection in the form of
priority in receiving medication. This would ensure that those best trained to fight a pandemic are
healthy enough to do so. More generally, compensation will ensure that those who comply with
restrictive government measures suffer as few adverse consequences as possible. If governments
expect individuals to comply with restrictive measures such as quarantine, recognition must be given
to the sacrifices individuals will make such as losing income and incurring other costs, some of which
will not be easy to quantify. If ethically-motivated reciprocity mechanisms were built into pandemic
14 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Mortality and Morbidity, Weekly Report, Revised US Surveillance Case
Definition for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Update on SARS Cases – United States and Worldwide (2003),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5249a2.htm viewed 19 March 2007.
15 See Barry, n 9.
16 Gordon J, “Pandemic to Kill 1000s, Cost Billions”, The Age (16 February 2006).
17 Brown D, “Avian Flu Virus Growing Similar to Lethal ’Spanish Flu’”, Washington Post (5 October 2005).
18 Kennedy S, Thompson J and Vujanovic P, A Primer on the Macroeconomic Effects of an Influenza Pandemic (Australian
Government Treasury, 2006), http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1069/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=TW_2006-01.htm viewed
12 March 2006.
19 See University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics Pandemic Influenza Working Group, n 8.
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plans in an open and transparent manner with participation from multiple sectors, then the plans would
earn greater trust, authority and legitimacy.20 Compensation from the government is one way to
achieve reciprocity.
COMPENSATION
Currently in Australia compensation in some form exists for damage to individuals, their goods and
property in the event of a pandemic under the health legislation of all jurisdictions except South
Australia. Different jurisdictions refer to compensation for “damage” incurred as a result of actions
taken by the government in the event of a pandemic. The Public Health Act 2005 (Qld) mentions “just
and reasonable compensation” in s 366 for suffering due to powers such as the exercise of detention.
However, it is unclear what “suffering” is and whether those indirectly affected – eg employers losing
income due to the detention/quarantine of its employees – will also be compensated. The Public
Health Act 1991 (NSW) is narrower in restricting compensation to cases involving disinfection and
destruction of articles (s 6) and to the exercise of powers of entry and the damage caused (s 72). The
Health Act 1958 (Vic) is also narrow insofar as compensation is only applied to cases involving
seizure of land, buildings or things under s 125. The Public Health Act 1997 (Tas) and the Public
Health Act 1997 (ACT) are more recent and broad in regard to compensation and damages incurred
under s 18 and s 122 respectively. For example, s 122 of the Public Health Act 1997 (ACT) defines
“eligible persons” for compensation to include those who have suffered loss or damage directly or due
to a family member’s death.
It is unclear whether the damage defined in these provisions refers to purely physical or health
damage. The damage incurred following a pandemic would also include financial losses incurred by
businesses and individuals. And individuals may experience economic damage in the short and long
term in many ways. For example, loss of income may threaten individuals’ financial security, and this
may affect the stability of the economy as businesses face declining sales and income. People may
also be left in the dark as how to start over and what their rights are, should they suffer losses as a
result of pandemic control measures.
COMPENSATION AND FAIRNESS
It is unclear from examination of the existent relevant public health provisions whether the potential
economic impact of a pandemic on the families of health personnel and essential service providers has
been sufficiently addressed. While some public health legislation (see eg the Public Health Act 1997
(ACT)) provides that compensation can extend to family members who suffer loss or damage due to
the death of a person who suffered consequent to actions carried out according to the legislation, it is
unclear whether this extends to all jurisdictions, how such damages would be assessed and whether
such compensation would provide for anything more than funeral expenses.
It is also unclear whether adequate consideration has been given to the impact of a pandemic –
and the impact of measures to control it, such as quarantine – on businesses and on working
individuals. The State and federal plans incorporate quarantine as a social distancing measure for the
control of an epidemic.21 Quarantine will result in people having their movement restricted and
businesses having their operations disrupted. Quarantine periods in Australia in 1918 lasted as long as
three months.22 Businesses may face closure or, if they are still operating, will undoubtedly be affected
by the disruption to essential services, by the loss of surety of supply and trade, and by absenteeism.
A pandemic would see large public gatherings banned, public halls closed and public utilities probably
shut down. Workers would not be able to arrive on time and many would stay at home due to fear,
illness or the need to care for family members. Working individuals may also lose income as a
consequence of both a pandemic and public health responses to it, such as those resulting from
restriction of movement or the necessity of having to care for ill family members.
20 University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics Pandemic Influenza Working Group, n 8.
21 New South Wales Government, Department of Health, n 6; Australian Government, Department of Health and Aging, n 6.
22 Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, 6 November 1919, p 2493.
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There are already means by which individuals and businesses may receive recompense for
damage incurred from natural disasters. It is possible to insure against natural disasters, and both
businesses and individuals may receive compensation from government for damages resulting from
natural disasters. Following Cyclone Larry, eg, families were able to access and claim normal social
welfare payments through Centrelink depending upon their circumstances, and they were also eligible
for ex gratia government payments of $1,000 per adult and $400 for children. There were also tax-free
grants for businesses and owners, fuel excise relief and concessional loans for farmers and businesses.
While it is likely that a similar scheme would be implemented in the event of a pandemic, it is not at
all clear how such a scheme would apply, given the differences between pandemics and other “natural
disasters”. A pandemic does not cause physical loss of buildings, goods and property, as a cyclone
does. Rather, the economic damages from a pandemic result from the restriction of movement, closure
of businesses, loss of health personnel and the impact on families.
Current private insurance companies offer protection in the instance of a pandemic. However,
compensation requires fulfilling criteria and conditions under existing categories of insurance. In the
circumstance of a pandemic, businesses and individuals may find that they would not be covered in
situations where they incur losses as a consequence of complying with government measures.
Businesses and individuals should not have to seek insurance against measures that benefit the
enforcers, ie the government, at their own expense. It is unfair to make those subjected to restrictive
public health measures suffer all the losses entailed, given that there will be a social dividend to
compensate them (if the net benefits of restriction outweigh the costs – as would have to be the case
for restrictive measures to be justified in the first place).
COMPENSATION AS A MEANS TO REDUCE IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY
A review of pandemic history suggests that a failure to consider post-pandemic issues, such as the
economic impact of pandemics, may have deleterious effects on the economy, businesses and families.
After the 1918 Spanish flu in Australia, the New South Wales Government enacted the Influenza
Epidemic Relief Act 1919 (NSW) which recognised that quarantine measures require businesses and
individuals to suffer costs for the safety of the public and provided for compensation for losses
incurred, including incomes, mortgages and debts. It is worth noting, however, that this compensation
was not available immediately after the pandemic; and debate regarding the appropriate assessment of
damages and the distribution of moneys significantly delayed the timely processing of applications and
ultimately reduced the effectiveness of the Act as a social measure.23
While some firms, such as Deutsche Bank, have made preparations for future pandemics arising
out of their experience with SARS, it is undoubtedly the case that most businesses are inadequately
prepared for a pandemic.24 Planning for a pandemic imposes extra costs on businesses, particularly
smaller businesses. Businesses already have to worry about increasing petrol prices, staff salaries,
rising inflation, insurance and interest rates. Because the government has not emphasised preparedness
plans for businesses, pandemic planning has not become a priority for businesses. The Australian
Government Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources has produced kits for preventing the
spread of avian flu but does not address the “impact on businesses” of social distancing measures.25
State and Federal governments could accelerate business pandemic preparedness by subsidising them
for pandemic planning and by creating a compensation mechanism for businesses and individuals after
a pandemic. This would encourage businesses to consider how they may function during and after a
pandemic and whether alternative approaches, such as flexible work practices and the use of
information technology, may reduce potential costs and losses. Assisting businesses to prepare for
23 Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, 6 November 1919, p 2493.
24 Carey J, Barrett A, Byrnes N and Tiplady R, “Avian Flu: Business Thinks the Unthinkable”, BusinessWeek Online
(28 November 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_48/b3961075.htm viewed 2 February 2006.
25 Australian Government, Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, What is a Human Influenza Pandemic? Being
Prepared for an Influenza Pandemic (28 June 2006), http://www.industry.gov.au/pandemicbusinesscontinuity/index.cfm?event=
object.showContent&objectID=0E0101C7-BCD6-81AC-150851A078A6725E viewed 18 November 2006.
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pandemics will not only benefit employers and employees, but also consumers and the wider society
as this would likely insulate the economy and support the capital and social infrastructure.
COMPENSATION AS A MEASURE FOR ENGENDERING COMPLIANCE AND TRUST
Public health interventions require public trust and acceptance in accordance with the principles of
justice.26 Measures such as mandatory quarantine, eg, entail dramatic coercive powers and restrictions
on individual liberty,27 and compliance with them requires both understanding and trust.28 For
example, during the SARS outbreak, compliance with quarantine measures relied heavily on public
trust in government and public education about the importance of quarantine.29 Penalties or even
criminal charges are often ineffective means to increase compliance with government measures.30
Inadequate compliance with pandemic plans may ultimately compromise their effectiveness. The
public is only likely to trust government and comply with infection control measures where there is a
genuine belief that the government is acting in the community’s and the individual’s best interests and
is acting in a fair, thorough and equitable manner. By demonstrating awareness of the impact of
pandemics and pandemic plans on individuals and communities, including the business community,
and by considering all possible means for ameliorating these impacts, such as compensation measures,
governments may facilitate both trust and compliance with these plans, and ultimately reduce
post-pandemic costs.
What limited evidence we have from contemporary pandemics suggests that governments would
be wise to consider the necessity for compensation measures as part of a comprehensive pandemic and
post-pandemic plan. DiGiovanni et al have shown that loss of income during quarantine is of critical
concern to those considering how they should respond to calls for quarantine and that compensation
may encourage compliance with voluntary quarantine.31 These findings were borne out during the
SARS outbreak in Canada where compensation measures were initially rejected by the provincial
premier on the grounds that they were unfeasible but then later introduced in recognition of the
sacrifice that health and non-health personnel had to make in preventing SARS and treating those
affected by it. Those (employed or self-employed) unable to work for at least five days during the
SARS outbreak were eligible for up to Can$6,000.32 Discussions about such schemes should occur
before the outbreak of a pandemic. Advanced discussion allows for consultation with different sectors
of society, ensures adequate measures are included and helps to avoid delays in compensation
provision.
THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Compensation would be a powerful tool in the developing world in curbing and preventing the spread
of H5N1 avian flu. In developing countries, efforts to control pandemic infection, such as the
widespread slaughter of poultry, have a major impact on communities and individuals. For many
people in the developing world, poultry farming is the only source of income; in the absence of any
sort of compensation there are strong disincentives to report incidences of the disease or to comply
with calls for culling. (Indeed, experience with H5N1 avian flu in the developing world has found a
26 Gostin L, “Public Health Strategies for Pandemic Influenza, Ethics and the Law” (2006) 295(14) JAMA 1700.
27 Annas GJ, Bioethics and Bioterrorism, American Bioethics: Crossing Human Rights and Health Law Boundaries (Oxford
University Press, New York, 2005) p 1.
28 John TJ, “Final Thoughts on India’s 1994 Plague Outbreak” (1995) 346(8977) Lancet 765.
29 Blendon R, DesRoche CM, Cetron MS et al, “Attitudes Toward the Use of Quarantine in a Public Health Emergency in Four
Countries” (2006) 25(2) Health Affairs W15.
30 McNeil DG, “Fight in Taiwan is Impeded by Resistance to Isolation”, New York Times (12 May 2003).
31 DiGiovanni C, Bowan N, Ginsberg M and Giles G, “Quarantine Stressing Voluntary Compliance” (2005) 11(11) Emerging
Infectious Diseases 1778.
32 Ontario Unveils SARS Compensation Package (13 June 2003), http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/
20030613/sars_compensation_030613?s_name=&no_ads= viewed 29 November 2005.
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high incidence of non-compliance with reporting requirements.) This issue has been recognised by the
World Health Organization’s project on ethics and influenza.33
RECOGNISED DIFFICULTIES
Implementation of a compensation scheme such as that described in this article would reduce the
impact of pandemic control measures on the economy and increase trust in, and cooperation with,
public health interventions. Such a scheme requires time, planning and resources; and there are
difficulties in determining who should be eligible for compensation, under what circumstances it
should be given and how the compensation should be distributed. But, as the public discourse
surrounding the 1918 pandemic in New South Wales makes clear, such issues can be explicitly and
rigorously addressed.
CONCLUSION
Pandemics and the measures used to control them can have an enormous impact upon communities
and on individuals. Introducing compensation measures into pandemic plans would increase trust in
government and public health institutions, increase compliance with infection control measures and
reduce the health and economic impact of pandemics. Compensation for businesses and individuals is
a fair means of reciprocity because both may suffer considerable harm as a direct result of their
cooperation with measures such as quarantine and social isolation. At the current time there is no
evidence that concerns regarding the personal and business “costs” of pandemics are adequately
addressed by either the Australian Federal or State pandemic plans. The time for such discussions is
now – before a pandemic occurs.
33 WHO. Addressing Ethical Issues in Pandemic Influenza Planning (2006), http://www.who.int/ethics/influenza_project/en
viewed 18 November 2006.
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